| 1. | The model is contrasted with the correspondence theory of truth.
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| 2. | Correspondence theories claim that true beliefs and true statements correspond to the actual state of affairs.
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| 3. | However, it is not strictly necessary that a correspondence theory be married to ontological realism.
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| 4. | Some forms of fideism outright reject the correspondence theory of truth, which has major philosophical implications.
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| 5. | Finally, some links were forged to the correspondence theory of truth ( Tarski, 1944 ).
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| 6. | Moreover, Kr�ger rejects Davidson's claim that the argument can refute the correspondence theory of truth.
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| 7. | Chapters 5 and 6 study the correspondence theory, where a statement is true when it corresponds to a fact.
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| 8. | The correspondence theory maintains that every atomic proposition coordinates with exactly one atomic fact, and that all atomic facts exist.
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| 9. | This is called the correspondence theory of truth and is to be distinguished from a neo-pragmatic conception of truth.
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| 10. | Socrates', Plato's and Aristotle's ideas about truth are seen by some as consistent with correspondence theory.
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